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Trading Privacy for Promotion? Fourth 
Amendment Implications of Employers Using 
Wearable Sensors to Assess Worker Performance 
George M. Dery III* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article considers the Fourth Amendment implications of a study on a passive 
monitoring system where employees shared data from wearables, phone applications, and 
position beacons that provided private information such as weekend phone use, sleep 
patterns in the bedroom, and emotional states. The study’s authors hope to use the data 
collected to create a new system for objectively assessing employee performance that will 
replace the current system which is plagued by the inherent bias of self-reporting and peer-
review and which is labor intensive and inefficient. The researchers were able to 
successfully link the data collected with the quality of worker performance. This 
technological advance raises the prospect of law enforcement gaining access to sensitive 
information from employers for use in criminal investigations. This Article analyzes the 
Fourth Amendment issues raised by police access to this new technology. Although the 
Supreme Court currently finds government collection of a comprehensive chronicle of a 
person’s life to constitute a Fourth Amendment search, widespread employee acceptance 
of mobile sensing could undermine any claim in having a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in such information. Additionally, employee tolerance of passive monitoring could make 
employer data available to the government through third party consent. When previously 
assessing employees’ privacy, the Court demonstrated a willingness to accept the needs of 
the employer and society as justification for limiting workers’ Fourth Amendment rights. 
Ultimately, then, Court precedent suggests that passive monitoring could erode Fourth 
Amendment rights in the long term.          
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
II. MOBILE SENSING STUDY OF WORKER PERFORMANCE 
 
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS CREATED BY EMPLOYERS’ PASSIVE 
MONITORING OF WORKERS’ PHONE USAGE, MOVEMENTS, AND PHYSIOLOGICAL 
DATA 
 
A. Over the Long Term, Widespread Employee Acceptance of Passive 
Monitoring Could Lessen Privacy Expectations in Shared Information, 
Undermining Claims that Police Commit a Fourth Amendment Search by 
Accessing Employer Data 
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B. Since the Court Has Previously Accepted the Needs of the Employer and 
Society as Reasons to Significantly Limit Employees’ Reasonable Privacy 
Expectations, the Court Could Allow Passive Monitoring of Employees 
 
C. Employees’ Tolerance of, or Submission to, Passive Monitoring, Could 
Make Employer Data Available to the Government Through Third Party 





Perhaps, as an employee, you were passed over for a promotion only to see someone 
less qualified win the position. Maybe you were an employer who sought solid evidence 
of job performance in order to select employees who would fulfill your organization’s 
mission. Both workers and supervisors may reasonably dread the cumbersome and labor-
intensive review process of self-reports and supervisor evaluations that can be both 
ineffective and biased. Both would benefit from an unbiased assessment system that could 
increase efficiency and fairness.  
Andrew Campbell, a computer science professor at Dartmouth College,1 decided to 
test whether monitoring employees’ “physical, emotional, and behavioral well-being” with 
smartphones, fitness trackers and position beacons2 could help employees seeking 
promotion.3 Campbell’s idea prompted a study that created a “mobile sensing system” that 
measured “employee performance with about 80 percent accuracy.”4 Claiming to have 
objective data provided by the study’s wearable devices, an employee could now say, 
“Here’s the evidence that I deserve to be promoted or that my boss is standing in my way.”5  
 
*Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Politics, Administration, and Justice; Former 
Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D., 1987, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. 
1983, University of California Los Angeles. 
1 Peter Holley, Wearable technology started by tracking steps. Soon, it may allow your boss to track your 
performance, THE WASHINGTON POST: (June 28, 2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019
/06/28/wearable-technology-started-by-tracking-steps-soon-it-may-allow-your-boss-track-your-
performance/  
2 Phones and wearables combine to assess worker performance: Mobile sensing and consumer tech 
upgrade the 
employee review, SCIENCE DAILY, SCIENCE NEWS (June 24, 2019) https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
2019/06/190624111606.htm (hereinafter “Science Daily, Phones and wearables”).  
3 See Holley, supra note 1. 
4 Id. This study resulted in the publication of the following paper: Shayan Mirjafari, Kizito Masaba, Ted 
Grover, Weichen Wang, Pino AUdia, Andrew Campbell, Nitseh Chawla, Vedant Das Swain, Munmun De 
Dhoudhury, Anind Dey, Sidney D’Mello, Ge Gao, Julie Gregg, Krithika Jagannath, Kaifeng Jiang, Suwen 
Lin, Qiang Liu, Gloria Mark, Gonzalo Martinez, Stephen Mattingly, Edward Moskal, Raghu Mulukutla, 
Subigya Nepal, Kari Nies, Manikanta Reddy, Pablo Robles-Granda, Kousuv Saha, Anusha Sirigiri, & 
Aaron Striegel, Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers in the Workplace Using Mobile Sensing, 
3 PROC. ACM INTERACTIVE MOB. WEARABLE UBIQUITOUS TECH., No. 2, Art. 37, (June 2019). 
5 See Holley, supra note 1.  
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While wearable sensors offer the promise of accuracy and fairness, these devices 
create Fourth Amendment concerns.6 Indeed, the government has shown an interest in the 
mobile sensing study. In the study’s acknowledgements, the authors noted that the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence and an Intelligence Advanced Research Projects 
Activity contract in part supported its research.7 Even without such direct government 
involvement, the study’s results could affect Fourth Amendment rights. Widespread 
acceptance of the collection of personal data involving employees’ physical movements, 
emotions, and habits could erode Fourth Amendment privacy expectations. The sensors 
used in the study, which ran continuously,8 collected information such as heart rate, sleep 
quality, and stress, and therefore accessed personal details encompassing bedroom habits 
and psychological states.9 Should providing such information to an employee’s supervisor 
become the norm, Fourth Amendment privacy expectations would be severely 
diminished.10 Police, pursuing evidence on issues including alibi, proximity to crime scene, 
and mental state, could mine a wealth of information by accessing the passive monitoring 
data employers collected.  
To be legally effective, however, such employee consent must be provided 
voluntarily.11  In Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers in the Workplace Using 
Mobile Sensing, participants’ privacy concerns were allayed by giving workers the option 
to participate in the study.12 Should commercial and government employers adopt such 
employee-monitoring technology, supervisors could likewise limit its use to volunteers. 
This approach, however, brings up its own Fourth Amendment concerns. The researchers’ 
method of obtaining consent—offering workers $750 for participating—hints at a simple 
way to overcome protests or even hesitation in making this technology common practice 
in the workplace.13 Individuals might unwittingly weaken their Fourth Amendment rights 
by consenting to employer monitoring. Employees might consent to wearing such 
technology due to their need to obtain cash incentives, because of a hope of remaining 
competitive for promotions, or simply to keep their jobs. These practical considerations 
might mask an employee’s underlying wish to avoid monitoring.  
In Part II, this Article examines the methods and conclusions of the study, 
Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers in the Workplace Using Mobile Sensing. 
Part III discusses Fourth Amendment issues created by this study. Specifically, this Article 
analyzes whether use of passive monitoring technology in assessing workers’ performance 
may undermine employees’ Fourth Amendment rights by eroding reasonable privacy 
expectations. Part III of this Article also analyzes precedent in which the Court has deemed 
 
6 The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This Article will focus on Fourth 
Amendment issues and therefore federal and state laws on employee privacy, as well as individual 
company policies regarding employee privacy, are beyond the scope of the Article. 
7 See Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 21. 
8 Id. at 8. 
9 Id. 
10 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court’s Fourth Amendment 
privacy analysis is fully explored in Part III, below. 
11 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). 
12 See Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 6. 
13 Id. 
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employees’ privacy to be significantly diminished, often due to the employees’ own 
choices. Finally, this Article explores whether an employee’s sharing of personal data may 
trigger the Court’s holdings that persons who share information with a third party assume 
a risk that the third party might expose the information shared to police. Woven through 
all of these issues is a concern about the voluntariness of employee decision-making in the 
context of the competitive workplace. Ultimately, this Article suggests that, while 
promoting fairness and efficiency, and eliminating bias, are noble goals, the use of 
wearable technology in reaching such ends could create unintended and adverse Fourth 
Amendment consequences.14  
II. MOBILE SENSING STUDY OF WORKER PERFORMANCE 
The Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers study was meant to provide 
both employers and employees access to hidden factors affecting job performance.15 
Providing employees with precise links between their stress, lifestyle habits, and 
productivity16 could “be the key to unlocking the best from every employee.”17 Study 
coauthor, Andrew Campbell, decided to study mobile sensing of employees after noting 
that Google, “one of the world’s premiere technology companies,” still relied on a 
“traditional performance review” to assess its employees.18 This standard assessment 
“typically relies on subjective input such as peer ratings, supervisor ratings and self-
reported assessments, which is manual, burdensome, potentially biased and unreliable.”19  
The study’s authors sought to examine a “radically new approach” to employee 
assessment by using phones, wearables, and positional beacons to unobtrusively and 
objectively measure performance.20 The researchers developed a “PhoneAgent” 
application for Apple and Android phones to “continuously and passively” track an 
employee’s “physical activity, location, phone usage (e.g. lock/unlock) and ambient light 
levels.”21 The researchers also used a Garmin Viviosmart 3 wristband to collect data on 
“heartrate, heartrate variability, and stress.”22 The Garmin wearable enables employees to 
enter their weight and automatically measures “step count, calories burned, number of 
floors climbed and physical activity (e.g., walking, running, etc.).”23 The study also relied 
 
14 This Article considers the Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers study only to explore the 
Fourth Amendment consequences of passively monitoring employees. The study’s scientific claims about 
performance are beyond the scope of this Article.  
15 See Holley, supra note 1.  
16 Id.  
17 See Science Daily, supra note 2.  
18 See Holley, supra note 1. 
19 See Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 2. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 8. 
22 Id. (“Stress” is measured by Garmin’s “proprietary black box.”). 
23 Id.  
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on Gimbal beacons24 to measure “time spent at the office and home as well as breaks taken 
away from a participant’s desk.”25  
Over 500 working professionals in the United States used these devices as part of the 
Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers study.26 The professionals, who worked 
at technology companies and universities, could either participate in the yearlong study for 
$750 or opt out of the study altogether.27 Both supervisors and non-supervisors 
participated.28 Researchers strictly monitored participants’ compliance, calculating the 
“compliance rate for each participant” by noting whether they had received data from a 
subject “for each 30 minute time interval.”29 In measuring compliance for 48 30-minute 
time slots in a 24-hour day, the study’s authors found it helpful to “stay in touch with 
participants” to alert them to any observed problems with compliance rates.”30 At the end 
of the study, the researchers paid the participants based on their average compliance rate.31  
Ultimately, the aim of data collection was to “shed light on behavioral patterns that 
characterize higher and lower performers.”32 The measurements, which were “processed 
by cloud-based machine-learning algorithms,”33 produced results both “interesting” and 
“potentially important.”34 Higher performers generally used their phones less throughout 
the day.35 Some higher performers used the phones “less during weekday working hours 
than during the same period at the weekend,”36 as well as less during the evenings of 
workdays.37 Higher performers also showed differences in their mobility and activity;38 
they were “more active and mobile in comparison to lower performers.”39 Sleep differed 
between higher and lower performing employees.40 Higher performers experienced “longer 
deep sleep periods during survey days and shorter light sleep periods during weekends.”41 
 
24 Id. (Describing beacons as “low energy radio modules that transmit and receive radio signals to and from 
other Bluetooth enable devices. The PhoneAgent app on the phone implements a Gimbal API library that 
enables the phone to detect encounters with beacons. To understand the protocol, consider smartphone A 
and beacon B. When A approaches B, A will receive the signal transmitted by B and report its signal 
strength. Generally, this signal strength increases as A and B are closer to each other. In this way, we can 
capture the mobility of participants at work.”). 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 6. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 9. 
30 Id.  
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 5. The researchers defined workplace performance with reference to a variety of skills, specifically, 
“how well workers and employees perform their tasks, the initiative they take and the resourcefulness they 
show in solving problems.” Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). A high performer was one who is “well aware of 
his or her role in the organization, and executes the underlying tasks and role well.” Id. 
33 See Holley, supra note 1. 
34 The researchers asserted their findings offered “important insights into higher and lower performers” and 
found what they called “a number of interesting results.” See Mirjafari, supra note 4, at 18. 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 “Mobility” is defined as “movement and places visited.” Id. at 19. “Activity” is “stationary or moving 
around.” Id. at 19. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 20. 
41 Id. at 20. 
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The authors surmised that since “deep sleep is important in memory reactivation and 
consolidation,” accumulating deep sleep might “be a crucial factor that allows higher 
performers to retain and recall information that enhances their performance.”42 Finally, the 
quality of work performance varied with heartbeat as higher performers experienced “more 
regular heart beat rates during the week particularly weekdays.”43 The study’s passive 
sensors, therefore, found close links between workplace performance and weekend phone 
use, sleep in one’s own bed, and the rhythm of one’s own heartbeat—personal details long 
considered beyond the relevance of an employer’s attention. The researchers saw their 
study as only the beginning, noting their work “opens the way to new forms of passive 
objective assessment and feedback to workers to potentially provide week-by-week or 
quarter-by-quarter guidance in the workplace.”44 
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS CREATED BY EMPLOYERS’ PASSIVE MONITORING OF 
WORKERS’ PHONE USAGE, MOVEMENTS, AND PHYSIOLOGICAL DATA 
A. Over the Long Term, Widespread Employee Acceptance of Passive Monitoring Could 
Lessen Privacy Expectations in Shared Information, Undermining Claims that Police 
Commit a Fourth Amendment Search by Accessing Employer Data 
Law enforcement, in its ongoing effort to improve its investigations, could find an 
employer’s accumulation of passive monitoring data a ready tool aiding its crime detection. 
Any inquiry into privacy issues of passive monitoring begins with Katz v. United States, 
the seminal case providing the Court’s most recent definition of a Fourth Amendment 
“search.”45 In Katz, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents attached an electronic 
listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth to record Katz’s voice as he 
illegally transmitted “wagering information.”46 In considering whether the FBI’s 
eavesdropping implicated Fourth Amendment privacy rights, the Court recognized that 
when Katz occupied the phone booth, shut its door, and paid his toll, he was “surely entitled 
to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be broadcast to the 
world.”47 Therefore, the FBI’s eavesdropping on Katz’s call “violated the privacy upon 
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search 
and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”48  
 
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 20. 
44 Id. at 21. Study coauthor Pino Audia––a professor of management and organizations at Dartmouth’s 
Tuck School of Business—suggested: “Passive sensors, which are the heart of the mobile sensing system 
used in this research, promise to replace the surveys that have long been the primary source of data to 
identify key correlates of high and low performers.” Science Daily, supra note 2.  
45 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Note, that the Court, in United 
States v. Jones, resurrected the “common law trespass” definition of a Fourth Amendment search described 
in the prohibition era case, Olmstead v. United States. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). The Olmstead/Jones physical intrusion test, however, 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
46 Id. at 348. 
47 Id. at 352. 
48 Id. at 353. 
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Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, provided an explanation of what is now 
recognized49 as the Court’s definition of a Fourth Amendment search: “My understanding 
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”50 Justice 
Harlan further noted, “a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects 
privacy.”51 In contrast, “objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ 
of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has been 
exhibited.”52 Justice Harlan’s reference to exposure of items to plain view, along with the 
Court’s warning that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection,”53 demonstrate that Katz 
crafted a double-edged sword. Katz extended Fourth Amendment privacy to places outside 
the home, intoning, “Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”54 At the same time, however, Katz refused 
to extend privacy protection to such a traditionally private area as the home if the 
homeowner’s own actions exposed that locale to the public by plain view.55 The Court thus 
placed part of the privacy determination in the hands of the individual—if one wishes 
something to be private from government scrutiny, one must avoid conduct that could 
expose information to others, even civilians.  
 The significance of Katz’s inclusion in its “search” definition of the impact of 
individual conduct on privacy was dramatically demonstrated in United States v. Miller.56  
In Miller, the defendant was charged with having an unregistered still, possessing 175 
gallons of whiskey, and failing to pay the whiskey tax.57 Miller moved to suppress bank 
records that the government obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.58 The Court 
found “no legitimate expectation of privacy” in the contents of Miller’s banking records 
because Miller’s checks, deposit slips, and other records were “not confidential 
communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions” and 
thus not protected by the Fourth Amendment.59 Accordingly, the Court found Miller’s 
argument that he only gave the banks documents “for a limited purpose” unconvincing 
because all of the documents contained “only information voluntarily conveyed to the 
 
49 The Court in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) noted, “Consistently with Katz, this Court 
uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking 
its protection can claim a “justifiable,” a “reasonable,” or a “legitimate expectation of privacy” that has 
been invaded by government action.” Smith further specified, “This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly 
noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the 
individual, by his conduct, has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy...The second 
question is whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.’” Id. 
50 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 351. 
54 Id. at 359. 
55 Id. at 351 (Holding that “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”)  
56 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
57 Id. at 436. 
58 Id. at 436-37. 
59 Id.  
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banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”60 Miller 
emphasized the individual’s own conduct in undermining the reasonableness of his 
assertion of privacy expectations, noting that each depositor “takes the risk, in revealing 
his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government.”61 The Court thereby created what has become known as the “third party 
doctrine,”62 which dictates that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even 
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”63  
The Court reaffirmed the third party doctrine in Smith v. Maryland, where police 
investigated a man who made “threatening and obscene phone calls” to a victim he 
previously robbed.64 By tracing the license plate of Smith’s vehicle, officers identified his 
phone number.65 Police then used a pen register66 to collect the numbers dialed from 
Smith's home phone,67 leading to evidence used to convict him of robbery.68 Smith raised 
the issue of whether use of a pen register constituted a Fourth Amendment search.”69 Smith 
ruled that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed 
from his phone, and therefore, that the police did not commit a “search” in using a pen 
register to collect those numbers.70 The pen register, which only disclosed numbers of a 
phone call rather than the call’s content, possessed only “limited capabilities” for privacy 
invasion.71 The typical phone user understood that she must convey the numbers dialed to 
the phone company in order to complete the call.72 As a result, the Court again declared 
that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties.”73 Smith, in using his phone, “voluntarily conveyed numerical 
information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in 
the ordinary course of business.”74 He therefore assumed a risk that the phone company 
would reveal this information to police.75 The act of sharing effectively destroyed 
reasonable privacy expectations. 
The Court seriously reassessed the third party doctrine in Carpenter v. United States, 
involving law enforcement collection of cell-site location information (CSLI)76 in an 
 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 443. 
62 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
63 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
64 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979). 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 736, n. 1 (Noting that “A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a 
telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does 
not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed.”). 
67 Id. at 737. 
68 Id. at 737-38. 
69 Id. at 736. 
70 Id. at 745-46. 
71 Id. at 741-42. 
72 Id. at 743. 
73 Id. at 743-44. 
74 Id. at 744. 
75 Id.  
76 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
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investigation of a series of robberies occurring in Michigan and Ohio.77 CSLI exists 
because every smartphone constantly scans its area to obtain “the best signal, which 
generally comes from the closest cell site.”78 Smartphones “tap into the wireless network 
several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner is not using one of 
the phone's features.”79 Further, every time a phone connects to a cell site, “it generates a 
time-stamped record known as cell-site location information (CSLI).”80 Federal 
prosecutors obtained a court order for providers MetroPCS and Sprint to hand over CSLI 
for Timothy Carpenter’s cellphone.81 The court orders82 in Carpenter enabled the 
government to collect “12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter's movements—an 
average of 101 data points per day.”83 The CSLI “placed Carpenter’s phone near four of 
the charged robberies” at the “exact time” of the robberies.84 Carpenter was convicted and 
sentenced to “more than 100 years in prison.”85 
In Carpenter, the Court evaluated whether Government access to “historical cell 
phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements” 
constituted a Fourth Amendment search.86 Troubled by the comprehensiveness of the 
information at issue,87 the Court emphasized the ubiquity of phones, noting that phone 
accounts outnumbered people in the United States.88 The Carpenter Court thus declared 
that it was confronting a “new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a person's past 
movements through the record of his cell phone signals.”89 The fact that CSLI was 
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” was particularly alarming to the 
Court.90 Specifically, CSLI gave an in-depth record of the holder’s whereabouts over the 
course of several months, providing “an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not 
only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations.’”91 CSLI not only expanded the government’s ability to 
track someone in space, but it enabled police to “travel back in time to retrace a person's 
whereabouts, subject only to the retention polices of the wireless carriers, which currently 
maintain records for up to five years.”92 Ultimately, the Court worried about leaving 
citizens “at the mercy of advancing technology,” which could “encroach upon areas 
normally guarded from inquisitive eyes.”93 The Carpenter Court therefore held that the 
 
77 Id. at 2212. 
78 Id. at 2211. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 2212. 
81 Carpenter was one of the alleged robbers. Id.  
82 Federal Magistrate judges issued the orders in this case. Id. at 2212. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 2213. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 2211. 
87 Carpenter emphasized the comprehensiveness of the government intrusion, mentioning: “comprehensive 
chronicle,” Id. at 2206; “comprehensive record,” Id. at 221; “comprehensive dossier,” Id. at 2220; and 
“comprehensive reach.” Id. at 2223.   
88 “There are 396 million cell phone service accounts in the United States—for a Nation of 326 million 
people.” Id. at 2212. 
89 Id. at 2216. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 2217. 
92 Id. at 2218. 
93 Id. at 2214. 
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government, in collecting CSLI, “invaded Carpenter's reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the whole of his physical movements.”94  
The Carpenter Court’s wariness of new technology that creates a “comprehensive 
chronicle” of a person’s life could offer support to employees wishing to shield their 
passive monitoring data from police scrutiny.95 Technology that detects each time an 
employee leaves her desk,96 picks up her phone,97 or experiences a change in heart rate,98 
readily qualifies as information that is “detailed and encyclopedic”99 and as an “all-
encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.”100  
Moreover, the ease of employer data collection from “continuous sensing tools” 
would reasonably trouble a Court concerned about the effortlessness of information 
gathering from CSLI.101 Employers’ ability to store data for years or even decades to use 
in promotion and pay raise decisions would likely offend the Court that was troubled by 
the storage of CSLI data for only five years.102 Indeed, the employer’s intrusion here is 
even greater than that posed by CSLI because wearables give information about sleep, thus 
providing a window into employees’ bedrooms.103 Further, wearables probe an employees’ 
heart rate, a physiological function magnitudes more personal than information about one’s 
location on a public street.104 The passive monitoring data thus provides clues to a worker’s 
“emotional and behavioral well-being” and psychological states, intrusions beyond 
anything possible with CSLI.105 Finally, wearables count both steps taken and calories 
burned, revealing evidence of physical fitness and weight, which can be quite sensitive 
subjects. Thus, confronted with the combined scrutiny from wearables, phones, and 
beacons of employees, courts could rightly find an invasion of reasonable privacy 
expectations, as the Supreme Court did in Carpenter.106  
Carpenter’s defense of one’s right to privacy from passive monitoring, however, 
must contend with other third party cases that define the boundaries of reasonable privacy 
expectations more broadly.107 Specifically, Katz warned that the Fourth Amendment did 
not protect information knowingly exposed to the public.108 Employees who submit to 
wearables, phone applications, and beacons could be said to have reduced their own 
privacy by choosing to display data to the “plain view” of outsiders.109 Further, under 
Miller, employees’ movements, phone usage, heart rate, and sleep could be labeled as “the 
 
94 Id. at 2219. 
95 Id. at 2211. 
96 See Mirjafari, supra note 4 at 8. 
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business records” of the employer, who has established a “substantial stake in their 
continued availability and acceptance” as evidence justifying employment decisions.110 
Further, any employee who argues that she gave access to this personal data only for the 
“limited purpose” of performance assessment would be offering a contention already 
rejected by the Court.111 Thus, Miller would not protect employees who “voluntarily 
conveyed” and “exposed” such personal data to their employers in “the ordinary course of 
business.”112 Miller suggests that employees took a “risk” in revealing their data to their 
employers, since the data could “be conveyed by [the employer] to the Government.”113  
The answer to these arguments resides in the dramatic advancement of technology. 
Carpenter found the traditional third party arguments unconvincing because new 
technology, such as CSLI, was simply so “qualitatively different” from the relatively 
simple banking and pen register technology considered in Smith and Miller114 that these 
cases offered little guidance in the 21st century. Third party doctrine thus failed to “contend 
with the seismic shifts in digital technology.”115  
Moreover, third party doctrine, premised on actively opting in to the sharing of 
information, does not adequately address voluntariness. The Carpenter Court noted that 
the third party doctrine was based on the reduced privacy expectations caused by 
knowingly sharing information.116 This “voluntary exposure” rationale, however, did not 
“hold up” for CSLI because this data was “not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands 
the term.”117 Since cell phones were “indispensable to participation in modern society” and 
collection of CSLI occurred “without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond 
powering up,” Carpenter concluded “in no meaningful sense” did a phone user voluntarily 
assume the risk of “turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”118 
Similarly, monitored employees do not consciously upload the information for their 
employers because all data is passively collected.119 An employee, like a cellphone user, is 
not truly sharing this information in an active manner as Miller did when writing a check 
or Smith did in dialing a number.  
However, in any workplace following the study design in Differentiating Higher and 
Lower Job Performers, the employee would make an initial conscious choice to share his 
data with his employer, opting into a program and receiving compensation for 
participating. This decision to opt in could cause the Court to find that the employee 
triggered the Fourth Amendment’s traditional third party doctrine of Miller and Smith, 
rather than the exception in Carpenter. Such employees opting into information-sharing 
schemes create difficult issues about the true nature of voluntariness.  
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The specter of employees torn by the choice between privacy and compensation is 
already playing out in work environments today. United Parcel Service (UPS) gathers data 
on its employees every day by using a black box in its trucks to record a driver’s activity 
“to the second when he opens or closes the door behind him, buckles his seat belt and [] 
starts the truck.”120 UPS then analyzes these measurements to improve productivity.121 This 
monitoring affects UPS’ bottom line, as “[j]ust one minute per driver per day over the 
course of a year adds up to $14.5 million.”122 Since UPS can now improve a driver’s 
delivery rate from 90 to 120 packages a day, the company views data as “about as important 
as the package.”123 The smallest movements do not escape notice. For instance, upon 
noticing that opening drivers’ doors with a key slowed the drivers down, UPS switched to 
key fobs.124 As one driver acknowledged, the tracking “feel[s] like big brother.”125 The 
driver reasoned, however, that he could not allow himself to perceive the monitoring as a 
personal attack because if he did, his frustration could lead him to not “even want to do it 
anymore.”126 The pain of intrusion on driver’s privacy is superseded, however, by financial 
incentive; UPS drivers, are “the highest paid in the business.”127 Thus, the practical realities 
of making a living have required drivers to trade privacy for compensation. Do UPS drivers 
calmly and fully consider the long view when accepting monitoring, or do they only 
consider the next rent payment? Have drivers, in choosing to accept monitoring, thought 
about and assumed the risk that UPS might choose to share their information with law 
enforcement? In short, can it truly be said that UPS drivers voluntarily chose to expose this 
information to a third party?  
If drivers have become inured to sharing their movements, other employees might 
reasonably become accustomed to sharing more personal data, such as phone use, sleep in 
the bedroom, and the beating of one’s own heart. These shifts in attitudes could 
significantly affect Fourth Amendment privacy rights. The Carpenter Court might shudder 
at the thought of compiling a comprehensive chronicle of a person’s movements; but, UPS 
drivers could see such a prospect as old news.128 Thus, Carpenter’s effectiveness in 
promoting the rights of passively monitored employees could, as time passes, become the 
slenderest of reeds upon which to lean, given the consent given by employees for such 
monitoring.  
Employees’ inurement to privacy invasion leads to another concern: any assertion of 
a right to privacy from passive monitoring would need to account for the ever evolving, 
and perhaps dissipating, nature of Katz’s reasonable privacy expectations in the wake of 
daily advancing technological intrusions. Society’s recognition of what constitutes a 
reasonable privacy expectation will inevitably evolve over time. Although Carpenter 
declared “the Court is obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading 
privacy have become available to the Government’—to ensure that the ‘progress of 
 
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Id. 
125 Id.  
126 Id. 
127 Id.  
128 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
Vol. 16:1]  George M. Dery III 
 
29 
science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections,”129 the Court’s ability to protect 
privacy from technology’s inroads on society’s reasonable expectation of privacy is 
alarmingly inconstant. The very process of scientific advancement could numb the 
populace to the intrusiveness of ever more ubiquitous technology.  
Society’s incremental acceptance of the erosion of privacy is demonstrated by one 
of the most common law enforcement intrusions, the Terry stop and frisk, recognized by 
the Court in Terry v. Ohio.130 In 1968, when the Terry Court considered a pat down frisk 
of a detainee, it did not minimize the severity of the government intrusion, instead noting 
that the “careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her 
body in an attempt to find weapons” was “a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the 
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be 
undertaken lightly.”131 Justice Scalia even questioned “whether the fiercely proud men 
who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on 
mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such indignity.”132 With quickly 
advancing technology, however, electronic frisks for weapons at airports and large venues 
are now seen as only a hassle rather than a “petty indignity,” a label Terry dismissed as 
inadequately describing the intrusive nature of its frisk.133 Societal acceptance of electronic 
frisks is now unremarkable, even though the practice is arguably more intrusive than a pat 
down on the street.134 In fact, airport security scanners have found cysts and hernias, 
something not expected from a constable on patrol.135  
The changing view of pat down frisks is not the only example of society’s gradual 
acceptance of technologies used by authorities to gather personal information. In Katz, the 
Court deemed electronic eavesdropping on only one side of a phone conversation to be a 
Fourth Amendment search.136 Now, however, people are accustomed to overhearing one 
side of a cell phone call, whether in a restaurant, a waiting room, or on the sidewalk. 
Further, “[c]ookies track our every move online”137—whether we are visiting sites 
regarding medical conditions, politics, or religion—with little reaction from the public 
other than a shrug of futility.   
The Court considered whether government use of a thermal imager to detect heat 
from inside a home in an effort to detect marijuana cultivation constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search in Kyllo v. United States.138 The Kyllo Court established a “firm” and 
“bright” rule that when “the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to 
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical 
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intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant.”139 Today, Kyllo’s privacy concerns sound almost quaint, as stores use 
sophisticated technology that, in one instance, told a father his daughter was pregnant 
before the daughter did.140 Yet, people still shop. So, even though in the fifties, “The 
Adventures Ozzie and Harriet” show made television history by having Ozzie and Harriet 
“share a double bed,” today, many might be unfazed that employees share sleep data with 
their employer even though it was gathered in the employee’s bed.141  
So, in the near term, pursuant to Carpenter, the Court would likely determine that 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy from passive monitoring’s creation of 
“a comprehensive dossier.”142 If past is prologue, however, in the future such passively 
collected data might become a societal norm no longer deemed deserving of privacy 
protections. Although the Court might maintain Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
definition, this test’s reach will be so diminished that it no longer offers protection to 
employees.  
 
B.  Since the Court Has Previously Accepted the Needs of the Employer and 
Society as Reasons to Significantly Limit Employees’ Reasonable Privacy Expectations, 
the Court Could Allow Passive Monitoring of Employees 
 
Precedent assessing the Fourth Amendment privacy of employees offers additional 
insight into protections for workers’ privacy from police pursuit of passive monitoring data. 
Over a half-century ago, in Mancusi v. Deforte, the Court applied the Katz test in weighing 
the privacy expectations of a Teamsters Union official.143 In Mancusi, a grand jury indicted 
Frank DeForte “on charges of conspiracy, coercion, and extortion” for forcing juke box 
owners to pay him tribute.144 State agents committed a warrantless search of an office 
DeForte shared with other union officials.145 The Court considered whether DeForte had 
“a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion” in the union office.146 
Mancusi noted that even though DeForte had a large room for an office and shared this 
space with others, he could still affect the reasonableness of his own privacy 
expectations.147 Since DeForte spent considerable time in his office and had “custody” of 
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his papers, the Mancusi Court ruled that he had a Fourth Amendment right to contest the 
invasion.148 DeForte enjoyed privacy because he could “expect that he would not be 
disturbed except by personal or business invitees, and that records would not be taken 
except with his permission or that of his union superiors.”149 When assessing the 
constitutional impact of individuals sharing access to information, the Court in Mancusi 
reasoned quite differently for employee expectations than it did for the third parties in 
Miller and Smith. Specifically, DeForte’s sharing of an office did not fundamentally change 
his privacy because he could have reasonably expected that only certain persons would 
enter the office and that records would only be accessed with permission.150 In contrast, 
the Court rejected such reasonable assumptions in Miller and Smith due to the exposure of 
information to third parties.151 
Nearly two decades later, the Court considered the Fourth Amendment rights of 
employees in O’Connor v. Ortega, a civil case involving a psychiatrist contesting his 
dismissal from a state hospital for sexual harassment and other improprieties.152 The 
psychiatrist’s superiors made a thorough search of his office, seizing “several items from 
Dr. Ortega's desk and file cabinets, including a Valentine's Day card, a photograph, and a 
book of poetry all sent to Dr. Ortega by a former resident physician.”153 The Court 
considered whether Dr. Ortega, “a public employee, had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets at his place of work.”154 O’Connor defined a 
“workplace” as including an area or item “related to work” and “generally within the 
employer’s control.”155 Accordingly, the workplace involved tangible items and places, 
such as “hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets.”156 The Court also discussed 
personal items an employee brought to the workplace. If an employee placed a personal 
item, such as a photograph, on a desk or bulletin board, the areas holding personal objects 
still remained “part of the workplace.”157 However, the items themselves, such as a 
“handbag or briefcase,” could still remain outside the “workplace” designation even if they 
physically existed in a place of work.158 Overall, employees had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, even in the workplace context, against police intrusions into private areas such 
as personal offices.159  
O’Connor warned that “actual office practices and procedures” could alter the 
“operational realities of the workplace” so significantly that employees’ reasonable privacy 
expectations could be diminished.160 For instance, employees’ offices might be 
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“continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for 
conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits,” thus eroding privacy 
expectations.161 Indeed, “some government offices might be so open to fellow employees 
or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable.”162 Recognizing the “plethora” 
of workplace contexts, O’Connor cautioned that employee privacy assessments required 
case-by-case analyses.163 The operational realities of O’Connor’s workplace ultimately led 
the Court to accept that “Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his 
desk and file cabinets.”164  
O'Connor's application of the Fourth Amendment to the case, however, did not 
provide the employee all traditional Fourth Amendment protections. Since the searches 
were performed by government employers investigating worker malfeasance rather than 
by police pursuing evidence in a criminal investigation, the O’Connor Court deemed the 
case to be one of “special needs.”165 In such a case, the Court weighs “legitimate privacy 
interests of public employees in the private objects they bring to the workplace” against 
the government interests occasioned by “the realities of the workplace.”166 The needs of 
the public employer in completing “the government agency's work in a prompt and efficient 
manner” outweighed the privacy concerns of the employee who could “avoid exposing 
personal belongings at work by simply leaving them at home.”167 The weight given to the 
employer’s special needs ultimately led the Court to forgo both the Fourth Amendment 
requirement that searches be supported by a warrant168 and the mandate that searches be 
based on probable cause.169  
As a special needs case, O’Connor might seem unhelpful in determining how the 
Court would handle a law enforcement search of employer records for evidence of a crime. 
O’Connor, however, is part of a collection of special needs cases in which the Court 
consistently ruled against providing the traditional protections of a warrant and probable 
cause to employees. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, for instance, the Court 
considered whether Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations, which either 
mandated or authorized the collection of biological samples from railroad employees, 
violated the Fourth Amendment.170 One such FRA regulation171 required that railroads 
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collect blood and urine samples from employees involved in any recent railroad accident.172 
Skinner held that compelled blood alcohol tests amounted to Fourth Amendment 
searches.173 Likewise, since there existed “few activities in our society more personal or 
private than the passing of urine,” Skinner recognized that urine tests intruded upon 
reasonable expectations of privacy.”174 Importantly, however, despite the sensitive nature 
of the intrusions involved, the government’s special need in ensuring railroad safety 
outweighed the intrusions of employee privacy.175  
While recognizing that the toxicological testing of employees could be viewed as 
significant in other situations, the Court found railroads involved diminished privacy 
expectations.176 Even though the Court noted that the passing of urine is so private that 
most persons “describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all,”177 Skinner equated the 
privacy intrusion associated with the FRA urine collection akin to an annual physical.178 
Further, the Court found a blood test’s intrusion insignificant since such “tests are a 
commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations.”179 Finally, the Court found 
the employees, by choosing to participate in the regulated industry of railroads, diminished 
their own privacy expectations.180 The employees’ privacy rights were thus so diminished, 
in comparison to the needs of the employers, that Skinner upheld the biological collections 
without requiring a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion.181  
United States Customs Service employees in National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab fared little better than the railroad workers in Skinner.182 In Von Raab, agents 
were subject to drug testing when seeking Customs Service positions requiring the carrying 
of a firearm or directly involving drug interdiction.183 Invoking “special government 
needs,” the Court declared, “it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations 
against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a 
warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.”184 
Accordingly, the “operational realities of the workplace” might “render entirely reasonable 
certain work-related intrusions by supervisors and co-workers that might be viewed as 
unreasonable in other contexts.”185 In this context, customs employees working directly 
with drugs and guns had lessened privacy expectations.186 The agents’ privacy interests 
therefore did not outweigh the government’s interests in their “fitness and probity.”187 The 
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warrantless and suspicionless biological testing was thus reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.188 
Special needs precedent is not alone in restricting the Fourth Amendment rights of 
employees. The Court has also used employees’ own choices to limit their Fourth 
Amendment rights against seizure of the person.189 In I.N.S. v. Delgado, the Court 
considered the Fourth Amendment implications of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service’s (INS) use of “factory surveys” to determine if workers at three garment factories 
were undocumented.190 To carry out the surveys, some INS agents would position 
“themselves near the buildings’ exits” while others “dispersed throughout the factory to 
question most, but not all, employees at their work stations.”191 The INS agents, wearing 
badges and armed with weapons and walkie-talkies, asked workers about their 
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citizenship.192 Yet, “employees continued with their work and were free to walk around 
within the factory.”193 As a result, Delgado found that “these factory surveys did not result 
in the seizure of the entire work forces.”194 Specifically, the Court rejected the contention 
that placement of INS agents created a seizure of all workers at the factories because 
employees’ “freedom to move about” at work is meaningfully restricted by their own 
“voluntary obligations to their employers” rather than “by the actions of law enforcement 
officials.”195 Once again, an employee could undermine her own Fourth Amendment claim 
by personal choices made in the course of work. 
The Court’s early case, Mancusi, provides a basis for considering employees’ 
privacy against police collection of passive monitoring data. Fifty years ago, the Court 
viewed employees’ rights as relatively robust, for DeForte could overcome the limits to his 
privacy caused by sharing.196 DeForte could preserve his privacy by using time and 
exercising possession—he won back his privacy by spending a “considerable amount of 
time” in the shared office and by maintaining “custody” of his papers.197 Further, he could 
reasonably expect fellow employees to respect his privacy since they were expected to 
forgo touching his items unless permitted by supervisors.198 The Court made no mention 
that employees assume any risk of others sharing items or information with police.199  If 
Mancusi was the only case addressing employees’ Fourth Amendment rights, workers 
might expect to maintain privacy from police requests for data regarding location, phone 
usage, and emotional states implied from heart rate. If an employee may reasonably expect 
privacy from police intrusion into an office, she certainly should reasonably assume 
privacy from official intrusion into a private cell phone located in the office or in data 
collected not from the office, but from the bedroom. An employee’s sharing of such data 
would not lead to diminished privacy expectations, in light of the shared nature of 
DeForte’s office. However, technological advances and workplace norms have affected 
employees’ lives in the half-century since the Court decided Mancusi.  
O’Connor, which defined the “boundaries of the workplace context” nineteen years 
after Mancusi, offers workers less assurance of privacy in passive monitoring data.200 
O’Connor might be a less than perfect fit, however, considering its 1980s context, where 
the workplace involved tangible office spaces separate from the home, as opposed to digital 
data.201 O’Connor, therefore, spoke of a workplace exclusively “related to work” and 
“within the employer’s control,” notions that dissolve when considering employees 
increasingly work from home with digital devices.202 Moreover, the crucial point of the 
Differentiating Higher and Lower Job Performers study is that behavior seemingly 
unconnected to work, whether phone use on weekends, mobility on weekends, deep sleep 
in one’s own bedroom, or heart rate in one’s own body, are now directly “related to work” 
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since activities affect worker performance.203 While an employee’s phone usage, 
movements, sleep, and heart rate are not directly within the employer’s control, via 
constant monitoring, they are within a supervisor’s continual view. The practical purpose 
of measuring such behavior is to modify it for optimum performance. Employers might 
turn job reviews into coaching sessions encouraging more exercise on the weekends, 
avoidance of alcohol that can impair sleep, and earlier bedtimes. The Differentiating 
Higher and Lower Job Performers study’s results hinted at such prodding, as the 
researchers meticulously checked the “compliance rate for each participant” for each of 48 
time slots in a 24-hour day,204 with the study authors finding it “useful” to inform 
participants of any “problems with their compliance rates.”205 This was bolstered by a 
carrot/stick approach because employees were compensated according to compliance rates 
in wearing the devices.206 O’Connor—decided well before the digital revolution—could 
not have predicted such employer scrutiny of employees, let alone offer specific rules for 
this passive monitoring.   
A further disconnect between O’Connor and workers today involves the personal 
items employees bring to the workplace. O’Connor took care to protect the privacy of the 
contents of items employees brought to their jobsites, such as briefcases.207 Today, it is 
these very items—cell phones, tablets, and wearables—which intrude on employee 
privacy. While O’Connor suggested to employees that they could avoid privacy intrusions 
by simply leaving personal items at home, 208 the Court recently recognized the practical 
impossibility of such a suggestion.209  
Despite its limitations, O’Connor may provide some understanding about the Court’s 
views concerning employee monitoring. The most helpful guidance for assessing the 
privacy of passively monitored data comes from O’Connor’s general admonition to 
consider “actual office practices and procedures” to measure the “operational realities of 
the workplace.”210 In a formal sense, an office’s “practices and procedures” are the written 
and agreed-upon guidelines directly addressing employee privacy policies. Such 
procedures, however, form only a part of the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, 
which considers “all the circumstances.”211 The actual “operational realities of the 
workplace,” which play out daily, could undermine written employment policies.212 
Employees who need a pay increase for financial stability, are ambitious for the next 
promotion, or fear losing their jobs in a competitive workplace might be vulnerable to 
employer suggestions that money, advancement, and job security could be bolstered by 
“voluntary” participation in a passive monitoring program. Concern about the prospect of 
not being perceived as a team player could increase pressure to opt in. Indeed, teambuilding 
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itself is an example of a corporate practice that could significantly alter a workplace’s 
operational realities.  
Teambuilding has been called “the most important investment you can make for your 
people” because it boosts “the bottom line.213 Employers therefore try to mold workers into 
teams through a dizzying variety of exercises: holding a “daily huddle,”214 “great white 
shark-spotting,” entry into a “Spy School Program” complete with crossbow-shooting, 
having a lesson to learn how to survive a plane crash,215 employee trivia games, creating 
one’s own job title, and escape rooms.216 It is not enough to build a team; teamwork must 
be “baked” into a company’s culture.217 Team building can exploit game theory, which 
“leverages people’s natural tendencies to compete” and “strive for status.”218 Employers 
could encourage employees to opt into teams of workers who compete against each other 
to improve their teams’ numbers on company-appropriate phone use, exercise and 
movement metrics, hours and stages of sleep, and even regularity of heart rates. Employers 
could even incentivize “compliance” with passive monitoring by rewarding those teams 
whose members shared the most information during a 48-time slot 24-hour day.219 At an 
early stage of monitoring, any employee concerned about preserving her own privacy need 
simply not join, and consequently only lose out on the “extras” earned by more “dedicated” 
employees.220 If participation, with its monetary rewards, became the norm, however, the 
few holdouts would find themselves in an “operational reality” of routine employee 
disclosure of information and therefore could no longer expect privacy to be the norm at 
such a business.  
The workplaces operating with large buy-ins by employees focused on raises or 
promotions, in stripping employees of privacy, would begin to resemble those employing 
railroad workers in Skinner or United States Customs agents in Von Raab.221 When 
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assessing privacy, context is crucial because the “operational realities of the workplace” 
could recast intrusions “unreasonable in other contexts” as “entirely reasonable” for 
“certain work-related intrusions.”222 If the company culture prods employees to share 
specifics about sleep or phone use, whether in the context of team building or as part of a 
competition for financial incentives, such collective disclosure could change the work 
landscape. This could ultimately lead the Court to find access to such information “entirely 
reasonable,”223 despite the intimate nature of the information. Since Skinner already 
allowed the collection of blood and urine, passive monitoring to gather sleep and heart rate 
data could progressively appear to be within the corporate norm. Pursuant to Skinner, the 
Court might even blame the employee for her diminished privacy expectations by 
reminding the worker that she chose to participate by taking the job (or in opting into the 
monitoring program) in the first place.224 The Court has used employees’ choices to limit 
not only their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches, but also against 
unreasonable seizures. In Delgado, the Court refused to find that garment employees had 
been seized by federal agents standing at the factory exits because these workers 
voluntarily chose to meaningfully limit their own movement by agreeing to stay at the 
factory while working.225 These workers’ decisions, probably taken without much 
reflection beyond wishing to have a job, had dramatic legal consequences: employees 
found no Fourth Amendment protection from INS agents standing at the factory door.226  
Employee Fourth Amendment rights have devolved considerably since DeForte 
vindicated his right to privacy in his shared office in 1968 in Mancusi.227 While the Court 
could find that employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data gathered by 
passive monitoring, such a ruling is in no way guaranteed. The Court could instead apply 
O’Connor’s definition of a “workplace” to determine that data about an employee’s 
emotional state, nightly sleep, or weekend activity relevant to productivity on the job is 
now appropriately “related to work.”228 Since such activities or attributes directly affect a 
company’s bottom line, they could be deemed “generally within the employer’s control.”229 
O’Connor’s “operational realities of the workplace” test, applied on a case-by-case basis, 
takes on a fluid quality that changes with each job and thus provides scant hope of 
permanent protection.230 The one constant seems to be that the Court, whether following 
O’Connor, Skinner, or Delgado, will hold an employee to the decision she makes, whether 
in bringing something personal to work231 or in taking the job in the first place.232 
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C.  Employees’ Tolerance of, or Submission to, Passive Monitoring, Could Make 
Employer Data Available to the Government Through Third Party Consent, Making any 
Fourth Amendment Search Reasonable 
Even if an employee’s choice to opt into passive collection of data does not trigger 
Miller’s third party doctrine,233 or so alter the operational realities of the workplace as to 
erode privacy expectations,234 such a decision could have Fourth Amendment significance 
due to the third party consent exception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, the Court 
has ruled that law enforcement may intrude on a person’s privacy, without a warrant, when 
it has gained consent from someone who possesses “common authority over or other 
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”235 The Court 
recognized this “third party consent” principle in United States v. Matlock, a case involving 
investigation of a bank robbery by police.236 Police officers arrested Matlock in the front 
yard of a home in which he had been living.237 Rather than seeking consent from Matlock 
himself, officers placed Matlock in their squad car and went to the door of the house 
without him.238 The Marshall family, of whom Gayle Graff was a daughter, was leasing 
the home.239 Graff answered the door, and upon hearing from the officers that they were 
looking for money and a gun, consented to a search of the home, including the bedroom 
she “jointly occupied” with Matlock.240 In their search of the room, officers recovered 
$4995 cash in a diaper bag.241 
The search in Matlock raised the question of whether Graff, as a “third party,” had 
the authority to give police consent to search a room she shared with Matlock.242 The Court 
found the “common authority” Graff would need to provide such consent depended on the 
“relationship” she had to the area searched.243 In particular, “common authority” was based 
“on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most 
purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to 
permit the inspection in his own right.”244  Mutual access or joint use suggests that all 
inhabitants had “assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area 
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to be searched.”245 Thus, Matlock, in sharing a room with Graff, assumed a risk that Graff 
would open the door to others.246  
The Court expanded on third party consent in Georgia v. Randolph, a case arising 
out of the troubled marriage of Scott and Janet Randolph.247 Police responded to a domestic 
dispute where each spouse accused the other of substance abuse,248 and Janet volunteered 
to police that there were “items of drug evidence” confirming Scott’s use of cocaine in the 
home.249 While Janet readily gave consent for police to search the house, Scott 
“unequivocally refused.”250 An officer then followed Janet into a bedroom in the home and 
recovered “a section of a drinking straw with a powdery residue,” which was later offered 
as evidence of Scott’s possession of cocaine.251  
The Court in Randolph inquired whether a search is reasonable when police obtain 
“the permission of one occupant” even though the other occupant, “who later seeks to 
suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent.”252 The 
Court held, “a physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry prevails, 
rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him,”253 basing its holding 
on “widely shared social expectations.”254 The reasonableness of the officer’s search of 
Scott’s home was “in significant part a function of commonly held understanding about 
the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests.”255  
Randolph applied its social expectations rule to a series of examples.256 In Matlock, 
for instance, when Graff came to the door of her home “with a baby at her hip,”  
she shows that she belongs there, and that fact standing alone is enough to 
tell a law enforcement officer or any other visitor that if she occupies the 
place along with others, she probably lives there subject to the assumption 
tenants usually make about their common authority when they share 
quarters.257  
By living with Graff, Matlock assumed a risk that Graff could admit a guest Matlock found 
obnoxious in his absence.258 The Randolph Court offered the contrasting example of a 
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landlord or hotel manager who would not possess the authority to admit guests in the 
absence of the current occupant’s consent.259 Randolph even offered the instance where 
common authority to consent existed but was limited:  
[A] child of eight might well be considered to have the power to consent to 
the police crossing the threshold into that part of the house where any caller, 
such as a pollster or salesman, might well be admitted … but no one would 
reasonably expect such a child to be in a position to authorize anyone to 
rummage through his parents' bedroom.260 
The Court in Randolph then applied its widely-shared social expectations test, concluding, 
“a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that one 
occupant's invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a fellow tenant stood 
there saying, ‘stay out.’”261 Randolph therefore ruled, “[s]ince the co-tenant wishing to 
open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to prevail 
over a present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police 
officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in the 
absence of any consent at all.”262 
The Court applied Randolph’s “widely shared social expectations” rule in its most 
recent third party consent case, Fernandez v. California.263 In Fernandez, an officer 
knocked on the door of an apartment “from which screams had been heard.”264 Roxanne 
Rojas, who answered the door, appeared red-faced and crying, with a “large bump on her 
nose,” and blood on her shirt from a seemingly recent injury.265 When the officer sought 
entry, Fernandez declared, “‘You don't have any right to come in here. I know my 
rights.’”266 Having probable cause to believe Fernandez assaulted Rojas, the officer 
arrested Fernandez, taking him to the police station.267 About an hour later, a detective 
returned to the apartment, obtained consent from Rojas to enter and search, and recovered 
evidence linking Fernandez to a robbery.268  
Fernandez confronted the very situation that Randolph considered—a conflict 
between two occupants about whether police might enter—but with the crucial difference 
that the police had removed the objecting occupant from the premises.269 This factual 
difference did not require a new test, for the Court still inquired about the “customary social 
usage” in deciding the case.270 The Court in Fernandez acknowledged that “a caller” would 
feel uncomfortable accepting an invitation from one occupant if the other commanded she 
“stay out.”271 The caller’s hesitation would stem from an expectation of “at best an 
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uncomfortable scene and at worst violence if he or she trie[d] to brush past the objector.”272 
This same visitor’s “calculus” would be “quite different, however, if the objecting tenant 
was not standing at the door.”273 As the Court in Fernandez surmised, “when the objector 
is not on the scene (and especially when it is known that the objector will not return during 
the course of the visit), the friend or visitor is much more likely to accept the invitation to 
enter.”274  
The Court, from Matlock to Fernandez, has thus constructed two rules for third party 
consent cases: (1) assumption of risk275 and (2) “widely shared social expectations.”276 
These tests led the Court to consider typical reactions people might have in all sorts of 
relationships, whether as co-tenants,277 estranged husband and wife,278 landlord and 
tenant,279 hotelier and guest,280 or domestic violence sufferer and abuser.281 Similarly, third 
party consent could offer guidance if law enforcement seeks consent from employers to 
access passive monitoring data. Since employees will choose to allow “joint access” to 
their employers to information from wearables, phone applications, and beacons, Matlock 
indicates that workers assumed a risk that their bosses might share this information with 
others, including police.282 Randolph’s “widely shared social expectations” thus requires 
the Court to consider the particulars of the corporate culture in which an employee found 
herself.283  
Correctly applying Randolph’s social expectations principle to the employment 
context may require considering the context of Fernandez, which involved social 
expectations stemming from power imbalances between the parties involved in a violent 
domestic relationship. Although, hopefully not in a situation as nightmarishly dire as that 
facing a domestic violence victim, employees often face a power imbalance that can 
severely harm their bargaining position with their employer. Such power imbalances could 
explain, for instance, a UPS driver’s acceptance of surveillance or an Amazon worker’s 
acquiescence in restrictions on bathroom breaks. Such power imbalances raise concerns 
about voluntariness. While Roxanne Rojas did not countermand Fernandez’s denial of 
entry to police, she let police come in when her abuser was absent and in police custody.284 
Similarly, employees will likely choose to avoid offending superiors in their aim to put 
food on the table. Employees, all too aware of the power employers hold over their 
financial fates, might fail to communicate their true concerns. Justice Souter noted a similar 
complication in his concurrence in Davis v. United States.285 He explained, “[s]ocial 
science confirms what common sense would suggest, that individuals who feel intimidated 
 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 304. 
274 Id.  
275 Matlock, 425 U.S. at 171, n. 7. 
276 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. As previously noted, Fernandez couched the “widely shared social 
expectations” inquiry as one of “customary social usage.” Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 303. 
277 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
278 Id. at 106. 
279 Id. at 112. 
280 Id.  
281 Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 295. 
282 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n. 7, 172. 
283 Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
284 Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 296. 
285 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 470 n. 4 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). 
Vol. 16:1]  George M. Dery III 
 
43 
or powerless are more likely to speak in equivocal or nonstandard terms when no ambiguity 
or equivocation is meant.”286 Employees, in short, through silence or hesitation, might slip 
into situations where they are sharing information that they would rather keep to 
themselves.  
The Court considered voluntariness in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, a case where a 
patrol officer searched a car he had stopped for having a burned out headlight and license 
plate light.287 When other police arrived, after the six occupants of the car exited the 
vehicle, one of the officers asked if he could search the car.288 One occupant, Alcala, replied 
in the affirmative.289 The officers then found three stolen checks wadded up under the left 
rear seat, leading to charges against Bustamonte for possessing a check with intent to 
defraud.290  
To define voluntariness of consent to search under the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
in Schnecknoth relied on precedent defining voluntariness of confessions under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.291 The Court realized that voluntariness could not “be taken 
literally to mean a ‘knowing’ choice’” because even confessions extracted by coercion and 
brutality involved knowing the “choice of alternatives.”292 Determining the presence of 
voluntariness, instead, involved an inquiry into whether the person’s actions were “the 
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.”293 If the individual did exercise 
such a choice, her will was respected; if not, then her will was “overborne” and her 
“capacity for self-determination critically impaired.”294 The Court assessed voluntariness 
by looking at “the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of 
the accused and the details of the interrogation.”295 Since this inquiry weighed all the facts, 
voluntariness did not turn on any “single controlling criterion.”296 Therefore, the fact that 
a person might not know of his or her right to refuse to answer questions or give consent 
was not, in itself, controlling.297 Schneckloth was careful to note, however, that any 
compulsion, even if implied or subtle, could undermine voluntariness.298   
Such “implied or subtle” coercion could infect an employer-employee relationship 
possessing a bargaining power disparity. Schneckloth considered, relevant to the “totality 
of the circumstances,” the “possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who 
consents.”299 The Court, when weighing consent to passive monitoring, might therefore 
consider the relative power inherent in the employee’s position in the company, her level 
of education, age, and sophistication.300 This might mean the Court could offer more Fourth 
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Amendment protection to junior employees and less to supervisors. Further, instead of 
assessing the “details of the interrogation” in the employment context, the Court could 
consider the behavior of the company and the work environment that it has formed.301 
Finally, the fact that a particular employee was not aware of his rights in the company’s 
employee handbook would not undermine consent. Schneckloth ruled that ignorance of 
one’s constitutional rights, an even greater liability than ignorance of worker rights, did not  
make consent involuntary.302 Any “totality of the circumstances” test for employee 
consent, relying as it does on all the particular facts of each individual case, fails to ensure 
consistent protection for workers in the future from police invasion of passive monitoring 
data. Thus, employee privacy protections need a sounder footing.  
One potential employee protection might be supplied by Garrity v. New Jersey, a 
case in which the Court considered the coercive effects of a threat to one’s job.303 In 
Garrity, police officers in New Jersey were convicted of “conspiracy to obstruct the 
administration of the traffic laws.”304 Before questioning the officers about fixing traffic 
tickets, the Attorney General warned each officer, “that he had the privilege to refuse to 
answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him.” However, the Attorney General 
also warned each officer “that if he refused to answer he would be subject to removal from 
office.”305 Given this choice, the officers answered the questions, resulting in their 
convictions.306 The Court then considered whether “the fear of being discharged” for 
failing to answer questions “made the statements products of coercion in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”307 The choice “between self-incrimination or job forfeiture” was 
“likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and 
rational choice.”308 Since voluntariness could be destroyed by coercion that was “mental 
as well as physical,” Garrity recognized that “[s]ubtle pressures may be as telling as coarse 
and vulgar ones.”309 Choosing between a job and exercising a right was the “antithesis” of 
a free choice, infecting the statements with coercion in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.310  
Similarly, when employees choose to accept passive monitoring, they might be 
facing a coercive choice between maintaining their Fourth Amendment right to privacy 
and their only practical option for “their means of livelihood.”311 While it is true that they 
are making a calculated choice based on their own interests, choosing the lesser of two 
evils “does not exclude [the possibility of] duress.”312 To apply Matlock in reasoning that 
employees have “assumed the risk” of exposure in such a situation would defy daily 
experience. Workers in such a bind face a terrible risk with either choice. It is questionable 
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whether the Court would consider Garrity, a Fourteenth Amendment due process case, in 
any Fourth Amendment consent case.313 Yet, in Schneckloth, the Court borrowed its 
analysis of voluntariness for Fourth Amendment consent from the confession cases 
analyzed under Fourteenth Amendment due process.314 Still, there is no guarantee that the 
Court would apply Garrity to passive monitoring cases. Ultimately, employees sharing 
personal data might be placing their privacy in jeopardy.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is some hope that the Court will protect employees from police access to 
employers’ passive monitoring data. Carpenter could identify such information as so 
detailed  and encyclopedic as to create the kind of “comprehensive chronicle” against 
which it deemed the Fourth Amendment should stand.315 The Court could also choose to 
view the “operational realities” of workplaces implementing passive monitoring as still 
requiring privacy for intimate details such as the functioning of an employee’s heart or the 
activities occurring in her bedroom.316 Finally, the Court could determine that employees, 
in allowing “mutual use” and providing “joint access” to their personal information, still 
do not assume the risk that employers would share such details with the government 
because such consent would be counter to the “widely shared social expectations” in 
workplaces.317 Yet, each relevant test, whether reasonable expectation of privacy, a 
workplace’s operational realities, or social expectations, is dependent on how a future 
Court will view the details in a particular case and provides little certainty for privacy 
protection. Further, with the interminable advance of technologies intruding into our 
privacy, and the public’s acceptance of these technologies’ conveniences despite their 
invasiveness, privacy from passive monitoring is in danger. Digital intrusions are daily 
draining the reasonableness of privacy expectations. Further, companies continue to erode 
privacy in the workplace. In this context, employees who allow monitoring could be seen 
as assuming a risk that companies will share information, no matter how intimate. 
 Perhaps, to grapple with the privacy invasions of the twenty-first century, we should 
look to musings from the first century. Plutarch, the Greek biographer living in the Roman 
Empire, declared, “Character is habit long continued.”318 The actions we take, no matter 
our motives, tend to affect ourselves and, for that matter, the world. A decision we make 
in an instant out of expediency could, if continually repeated over time or imitated by 
others, change our lives. Employees, perhaps bewildered by the impact of ever-advancing 
technology in replacing human labor, the lingering effects of the 2008 global recession, or 
international trade, might simply feel that they have no good options. If employees want to 
 
313 Id. at 499. Garrity inquired, “Our question is whether a State, contrary to the requirement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, can use the threat of discharge to secure incriminatory evidence against an 
employee.”  
314 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223.  Schneckloth declared, “The most extensive judicial exposition of the 
meaning of ‘voluntariness' has been developed in those cases in which the Court has had to determine the 
‘voluntariness' of a defendant's confession for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  
315 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211. 
316 O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717. 
317 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7; Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
318 Plutarch, Moralia, The Education of Children (Loeb Classical Library ed. 1927), http://penelope.uchicag
o.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Moralia/De_liberis_educandis*.html. 
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meet the mortgage or qualify for health insurance, they could reasonably swallow their 
objections and do the work needed to keep their jobs. This choice, while understandable, 
has costs. If an employee accepts passive monitoring today to get a needed pay raise, she 
may squander her privacy in the eyes of the Court tomorrow.  
With the Court’s current rulings, it might be necessary to view Fourth Amendment 
privacy as a precious resource that can be squandered if not carefully conserved. One 
employee, succumbing to the pressure of the moment, might have little effect on privacy 
doctrine. The accumulated choices of all workers, in contrast, could undermine our Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy. Such a prospect might seem terribly unfair, for it is those with 
the least power who are called upon, with each individual choice, to protect privacy for all. 
The existentialist philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, would offer little sympathy, as he once 
declared, “man is condemned to be free: condemned, because he did not create himself, yet 
nonetheless free, because once cast into the world, he is responsible for everything he 
does.”319 However troubled and limited our lot, we always have a choice about which 
actions we take. We cannot escape the consequences of our choices. We have to make 
privacy a priority for we might not be able rely on the Court’s current precedent to do so. 
If we submit to passive monitoring, putting all our faith in the Court, the resulting stress 
from doubt could betray our sleepless nights and pounding hearts to our ever-watchful 
employers.  
 
319 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, 29 (Yale University Press 2007). 
